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IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATING STATE CREATED RIGHTS INTO THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
 
By Esteban A. Aguilar, Jr.  
 
 
OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Professor Gregory Allen in Ninth Amendment and State 
Constitutional Rights suggested a hypothetical conflict 
that could arise between state and federal courts when a 
state constitution provides for greater protection against 
governmental abuse of power than the federal constitution.1  
There, he posited a situation where a state requires a 
warrant to tape conversations even when the parties have 
consented to the recording, or to seize telephone billing 
records while federal law does not require a warrant under 
either circumstance.2 If a state police officer then seized 
an individual’s telephone billing records without a warrant 
in that state, and those records were turned over to 
federal agents for use in a federal prosecution, should the 
records be admissible or excluded as illegally obtained 
evidence?3    
                                                 
1 Gregory Allen, Ninth Amendment and State Constitutional Rights, 59 
Alb. L. Rev. 1659 (1996). 
2 Id at 1659-1660, referencing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956-57 (N.J. 
1982) (holding that New Jersey State Constitution requires a search 
warrant to seize telephone billing records); Kenneth J. Melilli, 
Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State 
Law, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 667, 723-24 (1988) (noting no federal limitations 
on consensual eavesdropping on electronic surveillance). 
3 Id at 1660. 
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New Mexico has recently gone further and asked if a 
federal agent seizes records or evidence in violation of 
that state’s constitution, should the records be admissible 
or excluded?4
 These situations will continue to arise whenever any 
state chooses to “exercise its police power or its 
sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual 
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the 
federal constitution.”5  Some state courts have refused to 
admit evidence seized illegally according to that state’s 
constitution, but it remains to be seen whether a federal 
court will follow the lead of those state courts refusing 
to admit that evidence as the “fruit of the poisonous 
tree,” particularly if it is not required under federal 
law.   
One possible safeguard of autonomy for those states 
choosing to grant their citizens greater state law 
protections than the federal government is the Ninth 
Amendment.  The Ninth Amendment protects “unenumerated 
rights” that are retained by the people of the states.  In 
                                                 
4 Id.  See for eg. State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, 130 N.M. 
386, 25 P.3d 225 (holding that evidence seized by federal agents in 
violation of the New Mexico Constitution was not admissible in New 
Mexico courts), cf. State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327 
(1989) (refusing to apply the New Jersey Constitution to the actions of 
federal agents because doing so would hinder the principles of 
federalism and comity without advancing legitimate state interests). 
5 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
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theory, applying the Ninth Amendment would essentially 
federalize state law protections contained in state 
constitutions and guard that state from federal 
encroachment.  A federal court would be subjected to the 
same law as the forum state and under the earlier 
hypothetical, the federal court would be required to 
suppress the evidence obtained in violation of the state 
constitutional right, which would be federalized through 
the Ninth Amendment. 
The purpose of this paper is not to introduce the idea 
of what effect, if any, the Ninth Amendment should be 
given, a topic that has been extensively discussed.  
Rather, this paper will examine Professor Calvin R. 
Massey’s proposal for recognizing Ninth Amendment Rights, 
as well as explore some of the implications of adopting his 
three-part test.  It is my hope that examining these 
effects will aid a federal court system contemplating 
whether to elevate the Ninth Amendment as an enforceable 
federal doctrine amid genuine doctrinal concerns against 
such an application.  
THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
 
 The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
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deny or disparage others retained by the people.”6  On its 
face, the words of the Ninth Amendment suggest the 
existence of additional rights other than those 
specifically mentioned in the first eight Amendments that 
needed protection from governmental encroachment.7   
Yet, what was the full effect of the Ninth Amendment 
the Framers intended?  Professor Akhil Reed Amar suggests 
that the Ninth Amendment is based in federalism but “warns 
readers not to infer from the mere enumeration of a right 
in the Bill of Rights that implicit federal power in fact 
exists in a given domain.”8  Thus, the Ninth Amendment 
explicitly protects liberty by preventing Congress from 
going beyond its enumerated powers in Article I, section 8 
and elsewhere in the Constitution.9   
Professor Amar argues the Ninth Amendment is not 
merely duplicative of the Tenth Amendment, which provides: 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,”10 
but the two Amendments complement one another.11  He adds 
that “the Tenth says Congress must point to some explicit 
                                                 
6 U.S. Const. amend. IX 
7 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
8 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 123-24 (Yale University Press 1998) 
9 Id at 123. 
10 U.S. Const. amend. X 
11 AMAR, supra note 8, at 123-24. 
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or implicit enumerated power before it can act; and the 
Ninth addresses the closely related but distinct question 
of whether such express or implied enumerated power in fact 
exists.”12  Thus, the Tenth Amendment is about states’ 
powers and the Ninth is about rights.13  However, as 
Professor Amar recognizes, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
“are at their core about popular sovereignty,” explicitly 
invoking “the people.”14
In seeking to protect that popular sovereignty, James 
Madison believed that the Tenth Amendment might be 
“unnecessary,” but that “there can be no harm in making 
such a declaration.”15  Yet, Madison’s Ninth Amendment 
prevented the “implied diminishment of other rights and the 
implied enlargement of enumerated federal power,” and was 
necessary to address his own concerns about the possible 
dangers of enumerating rights, as well as the concerns of 
the state conventions which would be ratifying (or which 
could refuse to adopt) the Bill of Rights.   
The Nature of Rights and the Ninth Amendment 
When discussing rights today what typically comes to 
mind are the enumerated rights that individuals seek to 
protect through judicial enforcement.  Precisely what 
                                                 
12 Id at 124. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 1 Annals of Congress 439 (June 8, 1789). 
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“rights” were the so-called “popular sovereignty” 
amendments designed to protect and who were they designed 
to benefit?  Some scholars argue that the Ninth Amendment 
refers to individual “natural rights,” those rights 
retained during the transition from the state of nature to 
civil society,16 while others argue that the amendment 
protects the collective rights of the people to govern on 
all matters not specifically granted to the federal 
government, including the ability to choose who will 
govern.17
NATURAL RIGHTS 
Natural rights are those basic rights that an 
individual enters into society with that no government can 
deny.18  The growth of individualism in the 17th and 18th 
centuries led to the belief that individuals, because they 
are natural beings and creatures of God, have rights that 
cannot be violated by any individual or any society.19  John 
Locke, one of the most famous writers on the subject of 
natural rights, argued that all human beings are naturally 
in “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and 
                                                 
16 See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Constitutional?, 100 
Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1991). 
17 See Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223 (1983).   
18“ Natural Rights”, The Columbia Encyclopedia, Online Version (6ed. 
2001).   
19 Id. 
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dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think 
fit…without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any 
other man.”20  Perhaps the most recognizable expression of 
this concept comes from Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence: 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”21
 
The Declaration of Independence, coupled with the 
enumeration of specific, individualized rights in the first 
eight amendments, illustrate why some scholars believe the 
Ninth Amendment was designed to protect individual, natural 
rights.  Professor Massey argues that the Ninth Amendment 
was influenced by an understanding of natural law and was 
designed to protect individualized rights: 
“The structural role thereby envisioned for the Ninth 
Amendment can only be obtained today by treating the 
amendment as a source of individual rights judicially 
enforceable against…the federal government.”22   
 
Professor Massey adds that even if the framers 
intended the Ninth Amendment only to “hem in federal 
legislative power,” that objective can only be realized 
today by reading the Ninth Amendment as a source of 
                                                 
20 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr02.txt. 
21 U.S.C.A., Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776). 
22 Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 
61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1992). 
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individual rights designed to “frustrate the boundless 
exercise of federal legislative power.23
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
However, as Professor Amar notes, “to see the Ninth 
Amendment…as a palladium of countermajoritarian individual 
rights—like privacy—is to engage in anachronism.”24  He 
suggests that at the time the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
were adopted, the collective rights of “the people” were 
the basis for the recognition of popular sovereignty, or 
popular rights, rather than rights of a purely individual 
nature.  “If the Ninth is mainly about individual rights,” 
Professor Amar asks, “why does it not speak of individual 
‘persons’ rather than the collective ‘the people’?”25  He 
answers that “the conspicuously collective meaning of ‘the 
people’ in the Tenth Amendment (and elsewhere) should alert 
us that its core meaning in the Ninth is similarly 
collective.” 26  He adds that along with the Preamble’s “We 
the people,” the Tenth Amendment’s similarly collective 
phrase “to the people” serve as “perfect bookends, 
fittingly the alpha and omega of the Founders’ 
Constitution.”27   
                                                 
23 Id. at 52. 
24 AMAR, supra note 8, at 120. 
25 Id. at 121. 
26 Id at 120. 
27 Id. 
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Professor Amar argues that the ultimate supremacy of 
power lies in the “people,” and by accepting this notion, 
Constitutional federalism is a double-edged sword with two 
systems of government, state and federal.  He explains that 
“each constitutionally limited government can deploy its 
powers to police the constitutional limits on the other’s 
powers and remedy the other’s constitutional violations.”28  
Specifically, the state governments retain “the people’s” 
right to revolt in extraordinary times at the first sign of 
a national abuse of power, which will, “in all possible 
contingencies, afford complete security against invasions 
of the public liberty by the national authority.”29
“ENUMERATED” RIGHTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY 
The early state constitutions and declarations of 
rights, as well as the debates on the national Bill of 
Rights itself, provide a clue as to what additional rights 
the founders arguably intended to protect.   
New York, for example, was more concerned with 
protecting “collective rights” by establishing a liberty-
enhancing republican government.  New York’s Bill of Rights 
did not appear in its original 1777 constitution, and 
“seeming individual liberties in the body of the 
                                                 
28 Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalsim, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1492 
(June 1987).  
29 Id. at 1500-01. 
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constitution, stated in mandatory form, were concerned 
primarily not with individuals, but with the structure of 
government.”30  Nowhere did New York’s constitution 
explicitly address the protection of individual rights.  
However, collective rights such as the right to a jury 
trial, freedom of religion and due process, rights that 
have individual characteristics, were protected within the 
text of the New York constitution.31  
However, at the New York ratifying convention on the 
federal Constitution the concerns expressed about the 
proposed measure focused on both the civil liberties of the 
citizens of the state as well as the collective rights of 
the people.  Even before New York voted to ratify the 
Constitution, John Lansing in his June 20, 1788 address at 
the New York ratifying convention recognized that the 
proposed document did not adequately protect civil 
liberties, and amendments would be necessary down the road.  
Lansing explained he was apprehensive about a consolidated 
federal government because the proposed constitution as 
written, which gave power to that government, could not 
adequately protect the essential rights and liberties of 
                                                 
30 Robert F. Williams, New York’s State Constitution in National 
Context, 14 Touro L.Rev. 611, 620 (1998).  It wasn’t until 1821 that a 
separate bill of rights, similar to those in most states, was adopted 
in New York.  Id. 
31 Id. 
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the people.32  Lansing said that he would support any 
amendments down the road that would shield civil liberties 
from the possibility of abuse by a centralized Republican 
government.33
Just three days earlier, Robert Livingston argued that 
governmental power, whether state or federal, stems from 
the collective “people,” pointing to a “little understood, 
old world” principle that all power is derived from “the 
people.”34  Livingston pointed out that although all power 
stems from and remains with “the people,” those collective 
rights are not diminished when those people divide that 
power between the state and federal governments for “their 
own happiness.”35  He added that the division and grant of 
power actually serves as an additional safeguard of the 
collective rights of the people.36
However, the natural rights theory was just as  
prevalent in the constitutional debate in other states.  In 
Massachusetts, many delegates of the convention were 
concerned that the proposed Constitution had no declaration 
of rights.  Samuel Nason argued that he would gladly give 
                                                 
32 DEBATE IN THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, ELLIOT’S DEBATES (June 20, 1788) available at 
http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat_ny.htm. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (June 17, 1788).   
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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up some natural rights for the greater good, but not if 
there were no declaration of protected, individualized 
rights written into the document.37
Theophilus Parsons and others answered this criticism 
by arguing that a bill of rights was not necessary since no 
governmental entity, either local or federal, could impede 
on the natural rights each private citizen enjoyed: 
“It has been objected to that we have no bill of 
rights.  If gentlemen who make this objection would 
consider what are the supposed inconveniences 
resulting from the want of a declaration of rights, I 
think they would soon satisfy themselves that the 
objection has no weight.  Is there a single natural 
right we enjoy, uncontrolled by our own legislature, 
that Congress can infringe?  Not one.”38
 
 At the time the federal Bill of Rights was proposed, 
several states had in place their own bills of rights that 
contained language promoting both the individual natural 
rights of the people, as well as the collective rights of 
the citizens of their states.  Virginia’s bill of rights, 
established several weeks before the Declaration of 
Independence, established the collective rights principles 
that “all power is vested in, and consequently derived 
from, the people,” and that “government is, or ought to be, 
                                                 
37 DEBATE IN THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, ELLIOT’S DEBATES (January 9, 1788), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat_ma.htm. 
38 ID. 
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instituted for the common benefit, protection, and 
security, of the people, nation, or community.”39   
Virginia’s bill of rights also expressly acknowledged 
that all men are by nature free and independent, 
recognizing that “the people” have certain inherent rights 
which cannot be deprived or divested, “namely the enjoyment 
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and 
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness 
and safety.”40
However, Virginia’s Declaration of Rights  
accompanying its constitution also protected individualized 
civil liberties, such as the right to the free exercise of 
religion, the right to a trial by jury, and the right of 
freedom of the press.41
 Similarly, Maryland’s Constitution also began with a 
declaration of rights, establishing first that the right of 
government originates from “the people” and is “instituted 
solely for the good of the whole.”42  The declaration also 
grants “the people” the exclusive right of regulating and 
policing the internal government, including the right of 
                                                 
39 VA. CONST. OF 1776 (June 12, 1776), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/bor/vir_bor.txt 
40 Id. 
41 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (June 12, 1776), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/virginia.htm 
42  CONST. OF MARYLAND (Nov. 11, 1776), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ma02.htm 
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revolt to reform the old or establish a new government.43  
In addition to the collective rights of the people, the 
document also protected the individual’s right to freedom 
of speech and debate, the right of free individuals to 
participate in the legislature, the right to petition the 
government for the redress of grievances, and the right 
against self-incrimination.44
 New Hampshire’s bill of rights, which also pre-dates 
the federal Bill of Rights, recognized that each of its 
citizens was born with “certain natural, essential and 
inherent rights,” which included “enjoying and defending 
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, 
property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining 
happiness.”45  At the same time the New Hampshire 
constitution also recognized that some of its citizens’ 
inherent natural rights would be surrendered in order to 
provide for the common welfare of its citizens, although it 
was silent as to what those rights would be.46
 Pennsylvania was perhaps the most explicit in 
identifying specific rights within its declaration of 
rights, many of which were later embodied in the federal 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 NH. CONST. OF 1783, art. 2 (October 31, 1783), available at  
http://www.state.nh.us/constitution/billofrights.html 
46 Id. at art. 3. 
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Bill of Rights.  For example, in addition to protecting the 
collective rights of the people to govern for the benefit 
of the community and the right of revolt to alter or 
abolish government, as well as the individual rights of the 
free exercise of religion and the right to a trial by jury, 
Pennsylvania’s document protected the right to a speedy 
trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to be 
free from warrantless searches and seizures.47
THE LASH APPROACH 
Contrary to the positions that Professors Massey and 
Amar have taken that the Ninth Amendment is either about 
natural rights or collective rights, Professor Kurt T. Lash 
argues that “at the time of the Founding [of the Ninth 
Amendment], it was possible to embrace both natural rights 
and a strong belief in the collective right of the people 
to local self-government.”48  Professor Lash points to the 
dual protections inherent in the state constitutions (as 
illustrated above), as well as to the beliefs of the 
Founders themselves.   
For instance, the North Carolina convention declared 
on August 1, 1788, that there are certain natural rights, 
of which men, “among which are the enjoyment of life and 
                                                 
47 CONST. OF PENN., available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm 
48   Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 
Tex. L. Rev. 331, 363 (Dec. 2004)(emphasis added). 
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liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and 
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness 
and safety.”49  While this shows a strong belief in natural 
rights, North Carolina also proposed an amendment declaring 
that “each state…shall respectively retain every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution 
delegated to the Congress of the United States,” which 
exhibits an understanding of the need to protect the 
collective rights of the people as well.50    
 Professor Lash explains that while many of the 
Founders believed in natural rights, that does not 
necessarily conflict with the notion that their colleagues 
also had the collective rights of the people in mind.  For 
example, Jefferson believed in the natural rights of the 
states, and when Congress violated the natural right of 
free speech in passing the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison 
argued that the acts violated the collective rights of the 
states.51  Thus, although there is a certain level of 
ambiguity as to exactly what unenumerated rights the 
Founders envisioned when they created the Ninth Amendment, 
as Professor Lash points out, the Ninth Amendment can 
                                                 
49  DEBATE IN THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, ELLIOT’S DEBATES (August 1, 1788), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat_nc.htm. 
50 Id. 
51 See Lash, supra note 47, at 364. 
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protect both natural and collective rights consistent with 
its role as a constitutional safeguard.     
Madison’s Proposal 
When he announced his intention to introduce a federal 
bill of rights on May 4, 1789, James Madison did so in 
order to enhance the liberties and protections of the 
Constitution without disparaging state and individual 
rights. 52  Though Madison once agreed with some critics 
that carefully enumerated grants of power in the 
Constitution automatically granted all personal liberties, 
and that further enumerating some rights might by 
implication diminish unenumerated rights, he ultimately 
defended a national bill of rights: 
“If we can make the Constitution better in the 
opinion of those who are opposed to it, without 
weakening its frame, or abridging its usefulness 
in the judgment of those who are attached to it, 
we act the part of wise and liberal men to make 
such alterations as shall produce that effect.”53
 
However, there was widespread criticism of a proposed 
bill of rights.  The first was the position that 
enumerating powers in a federal bill of rights could 
justify a major expansion of federal powers, eroding the 
state’s authority against the federal government, precisely 
what the fledgling nation rebelled against a decade 
                                                 
52 RALPH LOUIS KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 290 (The University Press of 
Virginia, 5th prtg. 1996). 
53 Id. 
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earlier.54  Alexander Hamilton explained the position, 
arguing that bills of rights were not only unnecessary but 
dangerous since they could contain various exceptions to 
powers which are not granted by the Constitution, thus 
“affording a colourable pretext to claim more than were 
granted.”55   
This anti-federalist position expressed not a simple 
fear of having a central government of enumerated powers; 
rather, the concern was how could the states constrain the 
possible unfettered governmental expansion of those powers 
once they were enumerated in a bill of rights?  As 
Professor Lash points out, the concern was that enumerating 
rights might imply the “constructive enlargement” of 
enumerated powers, which would diminish “the scope of 
nondelegated powers, jurisdiction, and rights.”56  For 
example, federal courts, which are empowered to construe 
the Constitution and, as branches of the federal 
government, would likely do so in favor of federal 
authority when conflicts between federal and state 
governmental authority arise.   
The second criticism was that a national bill of 
rights, which would almost certainly be incomplete or 
                                                 
54 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (A. Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed. 1982). 
55 Id. 
56 See Lash, supra note 47, at 361. 
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inaccurate, would jeopardize any unwritten, but retained, 
rights of the people which were protected by the 
constitutions of the various states.   
Thus, it was necessary to draft a rule to address both 
criticisms, one that would prevent an unduly broad or 
unnecessary expansion of federal power when enumerating 
certain rights and at the same time ensure that states 
would retain their autonomy over matters that they had 
traditionally controlled.   
Madison addressed these criticisms in Congress during 
the Bill of Rights debates:   
“It has been objected also against a bill of 
rights, that, by enumerating particular 
exceptions to the grant of power, it would 
disparage those rights which were not placed in 
that enumeration; and it might follow by 
implication, that those rights which were not 
singled out, were intended to be assigned into 
the hands of the General Government, and were 
consequently insecure.  This is one of the most 
plausible arguments I have ever heard against the 
admission of a bill of rights into this system; 
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.  
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by 
turning to the last clause of the fourth 
resolution”57
 
                                                 
57 1 Annals of Congress 439 (June 8, 1789).  When proposed, the Ninth 
Amendment was originally the eleventh of twelve proposed clauses.  
However, the first two failed, changing the eleventh and twelfth 
clauses into what is today the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  For 
purposes of this paper, I will refer to these as the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.  See KETCHAM, supra note 52 at 291. 
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Madison addressed the concerns of the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists alike by introducing the preliminary 
version of the Ninth Amendment:   
“The exceptions here or elsewhere in the 
constitution, made in favor of particular rights, 
shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the 
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by 
the constitution; but either as actual 
limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely 
for greater caution.”58
 
Shortly after his speech in Congress introducing his 
draft of the Bill of Rights, Madison was appointed to a 
Select Committee consisting of eleven members of the House 
of Representatives to consider his proposed amendments to 
the Constitution.  The Select Committee, appointed on July 
21, 1789, consisted of one Congressional representative 
from each state that ratified the Constitution, excluding 
only North Carolina and Rhode Island that had not yet 
ratified the Constitution. 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut sat with Madison on the 
Select Committee and proposed a draft amendment that 
essentially combined the Ninth and Tenth Amendments: 
“And the powers not delegated to the government of the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the particular States, are retained by the 
States respectively.  [N]or Shall any [limitations on] 
the exercise of power by the government of the united 
                                                 
58 1 Annals of Cong. 454, 452 (1789). 
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States the particular instances here in enumerated by 
way of caution be construed to imply the contrary.”59
 
Sherman deleted Madison’s reference to “other rights 
retained by the people,” choosing to address state autonomy 
instead.  However, the Select Committee eventually adopted 
Madison’s approach and reinserted his express reference to 
rights.60  On July 28, 1789, the Select Committee reported 
back to the House of Representatives with the version of 
the Ninth Amendment that we are familiar with today.61   
The Ninth Amendment was formally adopted on December 
15, 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified by three-
fourths of the states, a little more than two years after 
it was approved by the House and Senate.62  Through the 
adoption of the Ninth Amendment, Madison effectively 
brought the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists together 
to assure that “the Constitution would leave intact those 
individual rights contained in the state constitutions, 
statutes, and common law.”63
                                                 
59 Roger Sherman, Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789), in VEIT, 
ET. AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS, 266-67 (University Press, Baltimore & London)(1991). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 
Va. L. Rev. 223, 258 (1982). 
63 Id at 259.  See eg. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (A. Hamilton) (Bantam Classic 
ed. 1982) (Hamilton argued that the adoption of the Constitution would 
not disparage the right to trial by jury retained by the states: “It is 
equally true that in those controversies between individuals in which 
the great body of the people are likely to be interested, that 
institution (trial by jury) will remain precisely in the same situation 
 21
The Ninth Amendment in the United States Supreme Court 
Despite its elite position as the ninth of ten 
amendments to the Constitution in the Bill of Rights, 
discussion of the Ninth Amendment remains infrequent in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Presumably, this is because 
of the legitimate fear that recognizing the Ninth 
Amendment, which has no structural starting or ending 
point, could lead to an explosion of federally enforceable 
rights.  Or, perhaps the Supreme Court has not been able to 
formulate a structured way to incorporate rights while 
providing distinct boundaries on the process to minimize 
potential abuse.  In any event, there are no cases that 
directly analyze the Ninth Amendment as an enforceable 
doctrine, and few that discuss it at all. 
According to Professor Lash, the earliest discussion 
of the Ninth Amendment came from Justice Story’s dissent in 
Houston v. Moore.64  Professor Lash argues that many Ninth 
Amendment scholars have failed to include Houston in their 
analyses because Justice Story refers to the Ninth 
Amendment as the Eleventh Amendment, its original place 
                                                                                                                                                 
in which it is placed by the state constitutions, and will be in no 
degree altered or influenced by the adoption of the plan under 
consideration.”). 
64 18 U.S. 1 (1820)(Story, J. dissenting). 
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among the proposed amendments prior to the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights.65
In Houston, the State of Pennsylvania prosecuted a 
private in the Pennsylvania militia under a state law 
requiring militia members to serve when called into 
service. 66  In 1814, President Madison ordered the Governor 
of Pennsylvania to provide militia members for the war 
against Britain, and the private refused comply.  He 
contended that the state law was contrary to the 
Constitution, arguing that federal power over the militia 
was exclusive of state regulation.67   
The Court held that the Constitution did not provide 
the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over militia 
matters, so the state and federal laws did not conflict.68  
However, Justice Story dissented, arguing that the federal 
militia law required a federal prosecution, making 
Pennsylvania’s law unconstitutional.69   
Justice Story began by declaring that federal power 
only extended to those areas delegated to Congress by the 
                                                 
65 Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. 
L. Rev. 597, 614 (Feb. 2005).  Professor Lash also points out that in 
the late 18th and early 19th century, many individuals, including 
Madison, referred to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as the Eleventh and 
Twelfth according to their position on the original proposed list, 
rather than their final position upon ratification.  
66 Houston, 18 U.S. 1, 2.  
67 Id. at 11. 
68 Id. at 11-12. 
69 Id. at 68-69. 
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Constitution, and in all other cases the states retain 
concurrent authority with Congress, “not only upon the 
letter and spirit of the eleventh amendment of the 
constitution, but upon the soundest principles of general 
reasoning.”70  He added that in those instances of 
concurrent authority when state and federal law collide, 
federal law is “of paramount authority.”71
Thus, Justice Story argued that simply because the 
Constitution has granted some authority to Congress in one 
particular area does not necessarily equal an “enumeration 
of all the powers which belong to the States” in that 
area.72  What those unenumerated powers are must “depend 
upon their (the states) own constitutions; and what is not 
taken away by the Constitution of the Unites States, must 
be considered as retained by the states or the people.”73   
Professor Lash explains that Justice Story’s  
treatment of the Ninth Amendment was aligned with the 
Madisonian view that the Ninth “limited the extension of 
enumerated federal power into areas of local concern 
retained by the people as a matter of right.”74  He adds 
that “to Story, constraining federal power (as opposed to 
                                                 
70 Id. at 49. 
71 Id. at 49-50. 
72 Id. at 51. 
73 Id. 
74 See Lash, supra note 65, at 622. 
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guarding particular rights) was the central purpose of the 
Ninth,” and Houston shows how Justice Story believed the 
Ninth Amendment should be applied to achieve that end.75   
More than a century late in Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority,76 Chief Justice Hughes argued that 
maintaining rights retained by the people through the Ninth 
Amendment “does not withdraw the rights which are granted 
to the federal government.”  There, the Court examined a 
congressional grant of authority to sell electricity, 
despite the claim that the state of Tennessee had the right 
to local regulation of power.77  Justice Hughes explained 
that the Ninth Amendment question was whether a grant of 
federal power to regulate electricity impeded impermissibly 
on the collective right of Tennessee to local regulation.78  
Finding that the federal regulation did not deny or 
disparage any state right, the Court upheld the 
Congressional authority.79
Several other cases more briefly detail the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment.  In Woods v. 
                                                 
75 Id.  This also explains why Justice Story’s dissent dealt heavily 
with enumerated powers, a Tenth Amendment (or twelfth to Justice Story) 
concept, yet he failed to mention that amendment in Houston.   
76 297 U.S. 288, 338 (1936). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 330-31. 
79 Id. at 338. 
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Cloyd W. Miller Co.,80 the Court upheld the Housing and Rent 
Act of 1947 as a valid exercise of Congressional War Power, 
noting that the exercise of war powers in times of peace 
would not threaten the Ninth Amendment’s retained rights.  
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,81 the Court held 
that the First Amendment provided a right of the press to 
attend criminal trials based on the Ninth Amendment.82   
To this day the most notable discussion of the 
Amendment was Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.83  There, the Court held that a Connecticut 
statute prohibiting the use or assistance in use of 
contraceptives was unconstitutional because it “concerns a 
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”84  The Court 
noted that it was dealing with a “right of privacy older 
than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, 
older than our school system.”85  
                                                 
80 333 U.S. 138, 141 (1948). 
81 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
82 See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: 
Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due 
Process, 32 U. Balt. L. Rev. 169 (2003), where Schmidt argued that the 
Ninth Amendment argument in Richmond Newspapers was inappropriately 
used as a rule of construction rather than an explicit guarantee of a 
right. 
83 381 U.S. 479 (1965).   
84 Id at 485.  The Court additionally held that the statute violated the 
First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, explaining its reasoning for 
each.  See Id at 484.   
85 Id at 486. 
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But, in recognizing the antiquity of the fundamental 
right to privacy in marriage, the majority opinion only 
quoted the text of the Ninth Amendment and failed to 
analyze how the “unenumerated right” of marital privacy was 
deserving of protection under the Ninth Amendment.  Justice 
Goldberg, realizing the deficiency in the majority’s 
opinion, added “words to emphasize the relevance of that 
[Ninth] Amendment to the Court’s holding.”86   
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg argued the 
Ninth Amendment supports the right of a married couple’s 
privacy in the first substantial judicial body of work 
advocating a Ninth Amendment rights issue.87  Concluding 
that the concept of liberty embraces the fundamental and 
basic right of marital privacy within the language and 
history of the Ninth Amendment, he stressed the importance 
of giving the Amendment its due effect: 
“To hold that a right so basic and fundamental 
and so deeprooted in our society as the right of 
privacy in marriage may be infringed because that 
right is not guaranteed in so many words by the 
first eight amendments to the Constitution is to 
ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no 
effect whatsoever.  Moreover, a judicial 
construction that this fundamental right is not 
protected by the Constitution because it is not 
mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first 
                                                 
86 Id at 487. 
87 See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: 
Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due 
Process, 32 U. Balt. L. Rev. 169 (2003). 
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eight amendments or elsewhere in the constitution 
would violate the Ninth Amendment.”88
 
Yet, after discussing that the Ninth Amendment should 
be an enforceable doctrine, Justice Goldberg provided no 
test for recognizing Ninth Amendment rights, merely 
concluding that the Ninth Amendment was not an independent 
source of rights.   
Finally, Justice Scalia made a brief mention of the 
Ninth Amendment in his dissent in Troxel v. Granville.89  
There, the court held that South Carolina’s grandparent 
visitation statute violated a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment 
due process right to raise children.  Explaining his 
position that the right of parents to direct the upbringing 
of their children is among the “unalienable rights” with 
which the Declaration of Independence proclaims “all 
men…are endowed by their creator,”90  Justice Scalia argued 
that the right to raise children is “among the other rights 
retained by the people which the Ninth Amendment says the 
Constitution’s unenumeration of rights ‘shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage.’”91  According to Justice 
Scalia, since the right is one of the “other retained 
rights” contemplated by the Ninth Amendment rather than a 
                                                 
88 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491. 
89 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
90 Id at 91. 
91 Id.   
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fundamental right, state legislatures have the power to 
pass laws concerning a parent’s right to make decisions 
regarding their child’s upbringing, but the federal courts 
and government lacked the power to affect such a right.92
THE MASSEY TEST 
 
 Professor Massey argues that the Ninth Amendment’s 
text, history and structural role in the Constitution 
“compels the conclusion that it establishes judicially 
enforceable federal constitutional rights with their 
substantive source in state constitutions.”93  Because any 
Ninth Amendment rights are those retained by “the people,” 
the best expression of “the people’s” intent logically lies 
within the state constitutions.   
Massey challenges Justice Goldberg’s conclusion that 
the Ninth Amendment is not an independent source of rights, 
arguing that in order to enforce the doctrine the Ninth 
Amendment must have the capacity to serve as an independent 
source of rights.  However, Massey’s view is not 
inconsistent with Justice Goldberg’s despite his assertion 
to the contrary.  Under Massey’s view the Ninth Amendment 
would not serve as an independent source of rights.  
Rather, as Justice Goldberg’s conclusion suggests, the 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and its 
Implications for State Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229 
(1990).   
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Ninth Amendment would essentially serve as an incorporation 
doctrine, similar to the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
federalize rights created by the state constitutions, thus 
protecting them from federal intrusion:   
“Just as Congress may not use its legislative power to 
establish a state religion, it may not use its 
legislative power to trench upon [N]inth [A]mendment 
rights.  Since the substance of those rights is to be 
found in state constitutions, the citizens of a state, 
through the medium of their constitutions, possess the 
apparent authority to disable Congress from limiting 
any rights the states specify as worthy of 
constitutional protection.”94
 
Additionally, under Massey’s approach, Ninth Amendment 
rights are capable of alteration or abolishment by the 
citizens of the state that defined those rights once they 
are federally incorporated.  As a matter of 
constitutionalism, the states would remain free to 
establish and alter their constitutional law “with any 
minor collateral impact on a federal constitutional right 
as a recognized part of the design of the Ninth 
Amendment.”95  :  
“While [N]inth [A]mendment rights are federal, 
their substance is derived wholly from state 
constitutional law.  This is consistent with the 
animating desire of the [N]inth [A]mendment’s 
proponents: to reserve to the people their rights 
under local law, and to insulate those rights 
from federal invasion.  With these principles in 
mind, it seems appropriate for a state polity to 
                                                 
94 Id at 1246. 
95 Id at 1250, noting doctrine established in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983). 
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have within its own control the continued 
vitality of any given state constitutional 
right.”96
 
Thus, in essence the Ninth Amendment gives state 
citizens the power to preserve certain areas of their lives 
from federal intrusion. Massey notes that applying such a 
dynamic view of Ninth Amendment rights some citizens of 
certain states will undoubtedly enjoy more federally 
enforceable individual liberty than others.97  However, he 
argues that all Americans will continue to enjoy the same 
basic package of express federal Constitutional rights 
under federal law, but only those rights recognized through 
the Ninth Amendment will vary from state-to-state.98  When 
the package of federal liberties is insufficient for the 
citizens of one jurisdiction, they have the ability to 
alter their state constitutions or depart to other 
jurisdictions that offer greater individual protections.99   
Massey argues that this is an incidental effect, and 
one the Framers intended, for “if Californians believe 
privacy to be constitutionally desirable and Michiganders 
do not, Michiganders can hardly complain if Congress 
invades their personal privacy in a fashion the [N]inth 
                                                 
96 Massey, supra note 93, at 1249. 
97 Id. at 1248. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
 31
[A]mendment would not permit with respect to 
Californians.”100
Additionally, Massey argues that once created, Ninth 
Amendment rights must be applicable to both the federal 
government and the state that created that right.101  
Because Ninth Amendment rights would be federal rights that 
derive their substance from another source of law, the 
state constitutions, application of the amendment to the 
states amounts to a federally enforced right to make the 
states abide by their own law.102  The logical problem with 
this view arises when a state chooses to amend its 
constitution.  Is it bound to abide by the earlier state 
created federal right “incorporated” through the Ninth 
Amendment?  Massey argues that this situation reinforces 
his earlier conclusion that once a state alters its 
constitutional rights, the substance of the federal Ninth 
Amendment right changes with it.103
However, an additional problem arises in that the 
federal government would be compelled to abide by state 
created law as a matter of federal Constitutional law, a 
form of “reverse preemption” that would essentially operate 
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101 Id at 1251. 
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as a state power veto on Congress.104  Specifically, the 
Ninth Amendment would act as a safeguard preventing 
Congress from using its carefully defined delegated powers 
to encroach upon an unenumerated federal right contained 
within a state constitution, much in the same manner that 
the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from compelling a 
criminal defendant to testify against themselves.105  While 
this “veto” power could provide an important mechanism to 
protect unenumerated rights, such a constraint on 
Congressional power could also lead to abuse by a state 
disagreeing with a legitimate federal legislative scheme. 
In order for his theory to work and potentially avoid 
such conflicts, Massey proposed a test to define the Ninth 
Amendment’s positive rights: a test that preserves the 
fundamental liberty of the people of the several states 
while protecting the legitimate federal governmental right 
to promulgate a sound national policy.  His test operates 
only when the asserted Ninth Amendment right is not 
preempted by the federal Constitution or federal 
Constitutional case law, and would “sift the wheat—
fundamental ‘liberty-bearing’ rights—from the chaff.”106   
MASSEY’S FIRST PRONG 
                                                 
104 Id. at 1232-33.   
105 Id. 
106 Id at 1257. 
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 First, the proposed right must be fundamental, and 
must be limited to those rights that preclude government 
action.107  Asking whether a Ninth Amendment right within a 
state constitution is fundamental ensures that only those 
rights that are compatible with the “ethos” of the nation 
are recognized.108  Massey recognizes that determining what 
constitutes a fundamental right is tricky, but current 
tests that rely upon history and tradition could be 
employed.109  Additionally, Massey argues that governmental 
intrusion on otherwise lawful individual conduct would be 
presumed invalid unless the government can show a 
justification for the intrusion:  “The Constitution 
established islands of governmental powers ‘surrounded by a 
sea of individual rights,’ not ‘islands [of individual 
rights] surrounded by a sea of governmental powers.’”110   
For example, to determine whether a state’s 
constitutional guarantee of a patient’s right to access 
medicinal marijuana is fundamental, we must first look at 
historical and traditional views of patient’s rights.  For 
instance, in California patients have a historically 
fundamental interest in alleviating pain under the 
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108 Id at 1259. 
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110 Id. at 1260 (quoting Stephen Macedo, The New Right v. The 
Constitution 27 (1986). 
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Calfornia Constitution.111  Applying the first prong of 
Massey’s test, the burden would then shift to the 
government to prove that it has a valid justification for 
intruding on the patient’s private conduct, such as keeping 
citizens off of illegal substances or removing those 
substances from interstate commerce. 
MASSEY’S SECOND PRONG 
 Second, the proposed right must not significantly 
impair other existing and recognized fundamental rights, 
since the creation of new right has the capability of 
“reducing the stock” of rights already held by other 
people.112  To discharge this aspect of the test, Massey 
asserts, the judiciary would have the responsibility of 
weighing rights against one another:113   
 
“The court would be required to assess the 
‘fundamental’ status of the right being infringed 
by a claimed.  If deemed fundamental, it would be 
necessary to determine the degree of 
infringement.  Only if the infringement were 
substantial should the putative [N]inth 
[A]mendment right be denied recognition, since it 
will be recalled that this test operates only 
when the source of the right in collision with 
the [N]inth [A]mendment right is also located 
outside of the Constitution.”114
 
                                                 
111 See Raich, supra note 5.  
112 Massey, supra note 93, at 1257. 
113 Id at 1262. 
114 Id at 1262-63. 
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For instance, a state constitutional provision that 
seeks to guarantee its citizens the right to practice 
private racial discrimination directly conflicts with 
federal Constitutional law, so there is no need to apply 
Massey’s test in this situation.115   
However, an individual citizen’s state constitutional 
right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures could 
directly conflict with a federal agency’s duty to protect 
the public, which is an exercise of federal regulation 
rather than an enforcement of a Constitutional provision.  
Thus, Massey’s test would be proper in this situation.   
Similarly, as was the case in Ashwander, the federal 
government’s regulatory right in a particular field could 
conflict with a state’s collective right to locally manage 
that area.116  Thus, applying the second prong of Massey’s 
test, a court would have to balance the two competing 
interests involved before determining which of the two 
rights should prevail.  
MASSEY’S FINAL PRONG 
The final prong of Massey’s test provides that the 
asserted Ninth Amendment right cannot operate in a fashion 
that unreasonably exports the social costs of the right.117  
                                                 
115 Id at 1263. 
116 See Ashwander, supra note 75. 
117 Id. 
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He argues that once Ninth Amendment rights are recognized, 
units of government could be susceptible to “factional 
alliances” set-up to capture the “machinery of government 
and deliver benefits to the faction’s members, the costs of 
which will be borne by citizens not affiliated with the 
dominant factions.”118    
Massey’s third prong closely resembles the dormant 
commerce clause, under which a state law that benefits its 
citizens while exporting the cost of that benefit out of 
state will violate the Constitution.  For example, in 
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,119 the Supreme 
Court determined that an Iowa statute limiting the use of 
certain large trucks within the state unconstitutionally 
limited interstate commerce.   
There, the state statute prohibited the use of 65-foot 
trucks, while most trucks were limited to 55-feet.120  
Although the state argued the truck size limit was related 
to safety, the Court found that Iowa “seems to have hoped 
to limit the use of its highways by deflecting some through 
traffic,” which violates the Commerce Clause.121  Thus, the 
costs of the benefit to the state’s citizens (less traffic 
                                                 
118 Massey, supra note 93 at 1263. 
119 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
120 Id. at 665-66.  Some trucks carrying farm equipment, livestock and 
mobile homes were permitted to be 60-feet long. 
121 Id. at 677. 
 37
on the state highways, which would translate to lower costs 
for maintaining those highways) would be exported out of 
the state.  
Massey proposes two questions to address this issue.  
First, if the state right at issue is one that on its face 
is designed to capture benefits for local residents at the 
expense of outsiders (as was the case in Kassel), the right 
cannot be elevated to Ninth Amendment status.122   
Second, if the right is facially neutral but imposes a 
disproportionate share of costs on outsiders while vesting 
a disproportionate share of benefits with insiders, that 
right must also fail Ninth Amendment scrutiny.123  For 
instance, in a resource-rich state that can generate 
electrical energy cheaply, the state amends its 
constitution to provide its citizens with free electricity 
and pays private companies to provide that service with 
revenue generated by new taxes on all electricity exported 
out of the state. In that situation, the benefit of the 
right would lie with the citizens of the state while 
arguably the costs would be exported out of the state.  
Thus, a federal court examining such a case would have to 
weigh the state’s interest in exercising their state 
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constitutional right against the burden such an exercise 
would export to citizens outside the state before giving 
that right Ninth Amendment status. 
Massey concludes that utilizing his three-pronged 
test, though not void of problems, would preserve the 
delicate balance between state autonomy and national 
uniformity as envisioned by the Framers124: 
“Use of the [N]inth [A]mendment in the fashion 
advocated here will create some friction at the 
margins; such a condition is probably always 
present in federal systems.  But that friction 
can be alleviated by a judiciary that understands 
the importance of federalism to the preservation 
of human liberty.  The [N]inth [A]mendment stands 
as a (now) silent reproach to those who urge the 
abandonment of judicial efforts to police the 
frontier between federal power and state-
guaranteed rights.”125
 
APPLYING THE MASSEY TEST TODAY 
 
 The most important benefit of applying Massey’s test 
is that states would retain their autonomy as a distinct 
sovereign government free to protect their citizens, 
consistent with the intent of the Founders and the spirit 
of the Ninth Amendment.  However, there are several 
additional problems that stem from the collision of the 
federal government’s right to set a national policy and a 
                                                 
124 Id. at 1266. 
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state’s ability to veto that policy by enforcing its 
unenumerated rights. 126       
MORE THAN FIFTY ONE DIFFERENT BODIES OF LAW WILL APPLY IN 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
 
 The first and most obvious implication of adopting 
Ninth Amendment rights in the manner suggested by Massey is 
that there could be fifty one different bodies of state law 
that would be potentially applicable in federal court 
through the Ninth Amendment, sacrificing whatever 
uniformity federal Constitutional law was once thought to 
have.  Massey noted that his approach would produce a 
federal system with a “richly variegated pattern.”127  By 
recognizing Ninth Amendment rights, whenever a state adopts 
a new principal of state constitutional law, it adds to the 
substantive body of law in that jurisdiction.  If a federal 
court examining a federal question had to look to different 
bodies of law each time a Ninth Amendment right was 
                                                 
126 See New Mexico Governor Calls for Legalizing Drugs, CNN.com (October 
6, 1999), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/us/9910/06/legalizing.drugs.01/, for an example of 
just such a situation.  Former New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson 
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of New Mexico.  If the New Mexico legislature had approved such a 
measure, a situation similar to that in Raich would arise.       
127 Massey, supra note 93, at 1248. 
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claimed, the federal system of laws might become 
unmanageable.128   
However, Massey points out, the federal system 
consistently applies the Erie129 doctrine in diversity 
cases:  
“It has not proven burdensome for the federal 
courts to manage with fifty-one different legal 
regimes in diversity cases under the rule of 
Erie…Thus, it is unlikely to be much more 
difficult for the courts to rely on state 
constitutional law to breathe life into this 
substantive dimension of the [N]inth 
[A]mendment.”130
 
In Erie, the Supreme Court struck down the Swift v. 
Tyson131 rule that federal courts were not required to apply 
the decisions of local tribunals, but only state statutes 
and long-established local customs having the force of 
laws.132  The Court recognized that there is no federal 
general common law, and Congress has no power to declare 
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state, 
“whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be 
they commercial law or part of the law of torts…no clause 
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon 
                                                 
128 Diversity jurisdiction is the only time a federal court would have to 
examine more than one body of law since in all other situations a 
federal court applies the law of its forum state. 
129 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
130 Massey, supra note 93, at 1248. 
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the federal courts.”133  It then invalidated Swift, holding 
that “this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights 
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to 
the several states.”134  Thus, except in matters governed by 
the federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to 
be applied in any case is the law of the state.135   
Therefore, from this language it appears that Erie is 
entirely compatible with Massey’s approach, and any test 
that is developed should seek to apply the doctrine.     
IF AN AREA OF STATE LAW IS UNCLEAR 
 
 Applying an Erie like analysis it is clear that when a 
Ninth Amendment right is asserted, a federal court should 
look to the law of the state creating the right.  However, 
what if the issue presented to the federal court involves 
an area of state law that is either unclear or undefined?   
This is an area where unlike the Erie doctrine, the 
federal court should not guess as to the meaning of the 
state constitution in defining the boundaries of the 
asserted Ninth Amendment.  Otherwise, the states would lose 
their ability to “check” the power of the federal 
government the moment their fundamental rights are defined 
by the federal judiciary.  The federal courts could refuse 
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to recognize any such rights, denying judicial enforcement 
of the asserted Ninth Amendment right, and “the fox would 
be guarding the henhouse.”136
There are two ways to handle these situations when 
they arise.  The first, easiest, and most logical approach 
is to utilize the state’s certification procedure if one 
exists.  The state court would then clarify the unclear 
area of state law for the federal court, which could then 
proceed with Massey’s test:   
“Certification…allows a federal court faced with a 
novel state-law question to put the question directly 
to the State’s highest court, reducing the delay, 
cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of 
gaining an authoritative response.”137   
 
Most states have just such a certification process in 
place, so extending those provisions to include unclear 
areas of state law whenever a Ninth Amendment claim is 
asserted is feasible. 
If no certification procedure is available, the 
federal court could utilize a Pullman-type abstention and 
refrain from deciding the Ninth Amendment question when the 
area of state law is unclear.138  In this context, however, 
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rather than a Pullman-like retention of jurisdiction, the 
federal court should deny the Ninth Amendment Claim.  The 
reasoning behind this is if a claimed state right is 
unclear under state law, it should not be considered a 
right for purposes of the Ninth Amendment because there 
would be no clear expression of the intent of “the people.”  
ONE FINAL PROBLEM 
Perhaps the most intriguing problem arises when asking 
what, if any, appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court 
should have to review decisions of a federal court looking 
to state law.  Under Michigan v. Long,139 if a state court 
decision is clearly and expressly based on separate, 
adequate and independent state law grounds, the Supreme 
Court does not have jurisdiction to review that decision.140  
Long was decided in order to avoid examining state law to 
decide the nature of a state court decision and to avoid 
the danger of “rendering advisory opinions.”141   
Nevertheless, in order to federalize Ninth Amendment 
rights it would be necessary, at least initially, for a 
federal court to review state law under Massey’s test.  
While those rights would be federalized through the Ninth 
                                                                                                                                                 
the need for deciding the constitutional question).  However, with the 
development of certification, abstention is discouraged.    
139 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
140 Id. at 1041. 
141 Id. 
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Amendment, the basis for the formation of those rights lies 
on separate, adequate and independent state law grounds.  
Thus, the question to be answered before Massey’s test 
could be implemented is whether the decision in Long 
applies to the Supreme Court’s review of federal decisions 
recognizing Ninth Amendment rights.   
The answer is complicated, particularly since the 
Supreme Court has the power to review federal 
Constitutional questions, which includes the Ninth 
Amendment but not state constitutional rulings that do not 
violate federal law.  However, if the Supreme Court were 
allowed to choose what unenumerated rights were deemed 
worthy of federal incorporation, the Court would encroach 
on that state’s autonomy, defeating the original purpose 
and intent of the Ninth Amendment. 
There is, however, a way around the perceived Long 
problem.  The Supreme Court would not decide whether there 
is a right under state law, it would simply examine the 
federal court’s application of the Massey balancing test.  
When a Ninth Amendment right is claimed in federal court, 
the court would apply the Massey test and determine whether 
the state constitutional right should be federally 
 45
incorporated.142  If the federal court determines that a 
Ninth Amendment right exists after applying the Massey 
criteria, the right would then be federally enforceable 
through the Ninth Amendment, so the Supreme Court would 
have jurisdiction to examine the new Constitutional 
question.  However, the Supreme Court would not be 
examining whether the state right exists or the state 
court’s application of its constitutional law that created 
the right.  Rather, it would only review the federal 
court’s application of the Massey test to determine whether 
the test’s criteria have been met.   
CONCLUSION 
 
As Justice Brennan suggested,143 the Ninth Amendment 
will never take its rightful place in the Constitution as 
the guardian of unenumerated rights unless a system is 
established that can adequately protect state autonomy 
without seriously hampering Congressional power to pursue a 
legitimate national policy.  Professor Massey’s test is a 
plausible and effective method through which the goals of 
                                                 
142 This would also be applicable to questions involving unclear areas of 
state law that a federal court certifies to the state’s supreme court, 
but only if the state court determines that a fundamental right exists 
under state constitutional law.  If the state court determines that no 
right exists, or if the federal court chooses to abstain from answering 
the state law question rather than certifying the question, the false 
Long problem would be moot. 
143 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). 
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the Ninth Amendment can finally be realized, consistent 
with the intent of the Framers.   
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